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transport; that is, the politics, economics and geography (PEG) framework. The motivation to analyse Saudia stems from the 
ongoing doctoral research the lead author is currently carrying out which is focused on investigating the strategic trajectories of the 
Middle East big three (MEB3). In this study Saudia has been identified as a potential key competitor which can exert pressure on 
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in this paper is structured based firstly on the category of politics, then geography and finally economics. The outcome of the first 
two categories demonstrates the extent to which politics and geography are more important to the airline than economics, as far as 
strategic direction is concerned. They also reveal that the airline may even enjoy better fundamentals than the MEB3 and, given 
the new economic vision of the Kingdom, the possibility of overshadowing one of the MEB3 is not excluded in the medium term. 
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1. Introduction 
The scope of this short paper is twofold. One is to strategically analyse a major Gulf carrier which tends to be left 
out of most studies focusing on the dominant Gulf carriers; also collectively referred to as the Middle East big three 
(MEB3). The other is to apply a novel, airline industry specific, strategic framework to carry out this analysis, 
developed by Ellis (2020) a year ago and referred to as PEG. The authors firmly believe that Saudia (previously known 
as Saudi Arabian Airlines) is an ideal ‘test-bed’ for PEG given the weight this framework gives to the geopolitics of 
an airline, with Saudia belonging to a Kingdom where geopolitics have a major influence and tend to outweigh 
economic considerations.  
Whereas the vast majority of studies focus on the MEB3, either zooming in on one specific carrier (typically 
Emirates), or focusing on the three of them collectively, academic work on Saudia is rare.  This can be attributed to 
(i) perceptions created by available published literature; that is, air connectivity in the Gulf is overwhelmingly 
provided by the MEB3; (ii) the volume of information disseminated by the media and also rolled out by the MEB3 
individually versus that - which is much less - by Saudia and other airlines based in the Gulf; (iii) the significant 
marketing efforts the MEB3 have led individually since their inception in establishing themselves as global network 
carriers; and lastly (iv) the direct and symbiotic link between the MEB3, as well as Saudia, to their home country. The 
MEB3 especially are indirectly market-buoyed by a constant, fine-tuned public relations campaign projected by their 
respective home State, compared to the less positive perceptions Saudia can rely on about its home State. 
The dearth of data and scholarly work available about Saudia also needs to be viewed in the context of the relatively 
sparse literature available on the MEB3 themselves. Indeed, these three carriers are arguably under-researched, with 
most of the research to date focused on Emirates (Aquilina Spagnol et al, 2020). Furthermore, over the past decade or 
so new emerging competition to the MEB3 have attracted most of the limelight, including Turkish Airlines for 
instance. Similarly, Ethiopian Airlines – an emerging large network carrier and a somewhat remote, yet growing 
competitor to the MEB3 - has also managed to draw more research attention than Saudia, despite remaining under-
researched still. This latter comparison with Ethiopian can only underscore more acutely how under-researched Saudia 
has been to date.     
2. Background 
This paper is premised on an ongoing doctoral research study investigating the strategic trajectories of the MEB3. 
This doctoral research is examining a set of internal and external forces shaping the MEB3 in terms of past, present 
and future strategic trajectories, with one of the main forces being emerging key competitor airlines such as Saudia. 
In that study, the MEB3 are de-linked from each other to enable individual airline evaluation against a set of forces 
(such as key competitor airlines), as well as evaluation against one another. Whereas the primary data about Saudia is 
yet to be collected - allowing for a thorough multi-faceted analysis of the airline including the use of onion-style 
frameworks - for the purposes of this paper it is deemed that PEG is the most suitable to study two of the most 
important forces shaping the strategic trajectory of Saudia, within the broader context of the doctoral research question 
the author is pursuing. PEG helps to generate clear core insights in an uncomplicated manner, which will be of support 
to the other methods of analysis in the main research study.        
3. Analysis method – PEG strategic framework 
The acronym PEG stands for politics, economics and geography (Ellis, 2020). Typical strategic frameworks of 
analysis employed in air transport management are SWOT, PEST and Porter’s five forces of competition framework 
(Shaw, 2016), while PEG is a strategic framework developed specifically with the airline industry in mind. While it 
is acknowledged that SWOT is the most widely used strategic framework in industry analysis generally (Grant, 2013; 
Grundy 2006), PEST is traditionally the favoured strategic framework in air transport studies (Shaw, 2016). 
Meanwhile, although Porter’s five forces model proves to be very insightful as far as airline industry profitability is 
concerned (Porter, 2008), the PEG framework includes and elevates one key category intrinsic to the airline industry; 
that is, geography. O’Connell (2011) remarks that geography plays a pivotal role in global aviation, and this is 
particularly the case when analysing the global reach of an airline’s route network (Lykotrafiti, 2020).  
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4. Application of PEG to Saudia  
The underlying reason for developing the PEG strategic framework is that politics and geography are fundamental 
categories of analysis when conducting a holistic strategic analysis of the airline industry, and they should not be 
sidelined or downplayed in favour of economic assessments (Ellis, 2020). In devising how PEG should be applied, 
Ellis (2020) is not prescriptive but only indicative. In this context, the paper here begins with the politics category 
given the central part it plays in PEG, then followed by geography, and finally economics at the end. 
4.1. Politics 
Politics refers to both the national and international levels of the airline industry (Ellis, 2020). At the national 
sovereign level one finds the domestic air market of an airline, traditionally being its network pivot, anchored as it is 
to its home base. Through a set of bilateral air service agreements (ASAs), its national air market connects to other air 
markets in other sovereign countries, whereby together they form the airline’s entire market or network. These 
connections between air markets through bilateral ASAs signed between countries represent the international level of 
the politics of the airline industry (this also includes jurisdictions like Hong Kong).  
4.1.1. National level 
On a national level Saudia is a very strong airline with 68% of domestic seat capacity and 36% of international seat 
capacity in Saudi Arabia (CAPA, 2018a). It has the largest capacity in the market fuelled by strong demand. The 
airline bears the name and flies the classical national emblem of its home Kingdom, clearly showing that the airline 
is firmly anchored in the country it represents. It ranks as the nineth most valuable Saudi brand in the Kingdom (Brand 
Finance, 2019). The Saudi Arabian air transport market was opened to private competitors in 2006. Consequently, 
new names have emerged over the past decade, predominantly operating in the domestic or short haul sectors, and 
broadly pursuing a low-cost business model, such as Saudia’s own subsidiaries flyadeal and Flynas. Yet, Saudia 
remains by far the strongest player in the marketplace. This can be attributed to an unrivalled domestic network of 27 
destinations and 44 international destinations (CAPA, 2021), improving product, and national brand loyalty. 
The airline is fully owned by the Saudi State, and despite reports in the past of possible privatization (Reuters, 
2017), no such concrete plans are in motion at present, at least for the core airline operations. It is observed that such 
reports were at times unclear in differing between corporatisation and commercialisation. Saudia operates out of all 
international airports in the Kingdom, with the largest being the two big transfer hubs of Jeddah (JED) and Riyadh 
(RUH). In 2018, JED alone processed 35.8 million passengers - exceeding the 34.5 million passengers at the much 
more famed Hamad International Airport (DOH) in Doha, Qatar - processed for the same year (Reuters, 2019). 
Meanwhile, RUH processed 27.8 million passengers, Dammam (DMM) 10.4 million, and Madinah (MED) 8.8 million 
(GACA, 2019). Foreign competition is carefully controlled. In 2014 Qatar Airways – lacking a domestic air market – 
realised it was the most reliant of the MEB3 on more price sensitive connecting traffic, attempted to launch a 
subsidiary in Saudi Arabia; Al Maha Airways. This was meant to be a domestic-only carrier flying within the 
Kingdom. The airline launch was repeatedly postponed through to 2017 when Qatar Airways finally decided to abort 
the project, citing bureaucracy on the part of the Saudi authorities (CH Aviation, 2017).   
Saudi Arabia is currently emerging from decades of insularity and transitioning into a new political era of 
international engagement, supported by the implementation of an ambitious economic vision to support and expand 
the economy to usher in a post oil era. International tourism is one catalyst behind this new economy (Vision 2030, 
2021). Within this context, Saudia is a political and economic State-owned tool to fulfil this ambition. Aquilina 
Spagnol et al (2020) point out that in the case of the Gulf carriers what is remarkable about their State ownership is 
that this is translated into the airline, or the airline group, being strategically positioned in the local economy; thus, 
allowing them to be aligned with and benefit from the national economic vision. Like with the MEB3, particularly 
Emirates and Qatar Airways, this 100% State ownership and Saudia’s central role in its government’s economic plans, 
translate into financial backing and unwavering national support, including in government policies, which in turn are 
conducive to making Saudia a global challenger of the MEB3.  
While it has been recently reported that a second national airline could be set up based in Riyadh (Al-Monitor, 
2021), precise plans remain vague. One can assume that due to the transformation programme Saudia is presently 
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undergoing to position itself as a major Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) airline, and given this programme is closely 
interlinked with the Kingdom’s Vision 2030, any second national airline would be complementary to Saudia and not 
a direct competitive threat.   
4.1.2. International level 
On an international level, although Saudia lies in the shadows of the neighbouring MEB3 in terms of destinations 
served, and their considerable marketing and public relations efforts, along with their international recruitment 
campaigns and global accolades, Saudia still operates a sizeable network spanning four continents and serves some of 
the longest routes in the industry (Arab News, 2015). Like its neighbours, and with the exception of the all wide-body 
fleet of Emirates, Saudia operates a modern mixed fleet of short, medium and long-haul aircraft (Saudia, 2021), with 
a much lower number of dedicated freighters which situates it in this regard as being broadly similar to Etihad. 
        It is noteworthy that Saudia is part of SkyTeam and therefore enjoys an enhanced level of marketing 
cooperation with 18 other airlines. Through such an airline alliance, it can offer streamlined access to more than 1,036 
destinations worldwide (SkyTeam, 2021). SkyTeam membership enables Saudia to provide a somewhat distinct 
offering compared with the neighbouring MEB3 and other regional competitors, in terms of alternate transfer hubs 
and overall product offering. Qatar Airways is a oneworld alliance member, whilst key competitors Turkish Airlines 
and Ethiopian Airlines are members of Star Alliance. Emirates and Etihad remained unaligned, although both have a 
wide range of code-share and bilateral strategic partnership agreements.   
For Saudia to achieve the global reach of its MEB3 peers, its home State needs to increase its efforts in signing not 
only traditional ASAs, but more importantly, liberalising current agreements, including fifth freedom traffic rights, as 
well as granting rights in an unlimited and unrestricted manner. Being the exclusive flag carrier of the Kingdom, more 
liberal bilateral ASAs and multilateral agreements will unlock new destinations for the airline, giving it the flexibility 
to not only increase traditional origin and destination (O&D) traffic, but also of exploiting more unusual freedoms of 
the air to bring financial sustainability to otherwise unviable routes. Emirates has done so in successfully connecting 
West to East through its transfer hub in Dubai; not only to maximise profitability of trunk routes but also to connect 
smaller cities to its home hub which otherwise would not be financially possible. Dubai to Malta via Larnaca is a good 
example. In their analysis of Tunisair, Schlumberger and Weisskopf (2012) observe that one of the reasons why the 
airline did not fare well in capturing sixth freedom traffic as much as Royal Air Maroc did between Europe and West 
Africa, is partially because of more restrictive bilateral agreements. 
Unlike its neighbouring Gulf States of the UAE, Qatar and lately Oman, Saudi Arabia has not embarked on any 
talks with the EU to sign an open skies agreement with the bloc. Whilst the UAE walked away from such an agreement 
at the eleventh hour in 2019, Qatar has finalized such a deal, enabling Qatar Airways to address its traffic right deficit 
vis a’ vis Emirates. Furthermore, while Saudi Arabia does have an open skies treaty with the US (Flight Global, 2011), 
this is not reflective of any particularly liberal stance that the Kingdom adopts in traffic rights negotiations. In 2004 
Saudi Arabia did not sign the Damascus Convention; known as the ‘Arab League Open Skies Agreement’ which 
sought to encourage “the gradual liberalization of air transport within a regional and multilateral framework” 
(Schlumberger, 2010). Saudi Arabia’s abstention from signing it is in contrast to neighbouring Gulf States such as 
Qatar, Oman and Bahrain.  
Likewise, to date Saudi Arabia has not yet signed the International Air Services Transit Agreement (IASTA), 1944 
(ICAO, 2021), an agreement complementing the 1944 Chicago Convention which grants automatically to its State 
signatories the first freedom (overflight) and second freedom (refueling and technical stops) of the air (McGill, 2021). 
Saudi Arabia’s abstention from this agreement proved to be a major point of contention during the Qatar blockade 
which began in 2017 and ended in 2021. One of the central consequences of this blockade was the prohibition of all 
Qatar Airways and Qatari registered aircraft from flying into Saudi airspace. When dispute resolution proceedings 
were launched by Qatar at the ICAO Council, to its defence Saudia Arabia maintained that given it was never a 
signatory of IASTA, it had the right to block Qatari aircraft from its airspace (Jus mundi, 2020).   
It must be mentioned though that in July 2021 Saudi Arabia announced that IATA would open its regional 
headquarters in the Kingdom, demonstrating in the process a more international approach to air transport (Saudi 
Gazette, 2021). 
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4.2.  Geography 
Geography reveals where and why an airline operates (Ellis, 2018). This explains for example why the MEB3 are 
large network carriers out of necessity, whereas comparatively speaking Saudia lags behind in international travel but 
relies on its domestic travel component as a large percentage of its total traffic carried (40%+ pre-Covid pandemic) 
(CAPA, 2018b). Airlines in the UAE and Qatar have no choice but to compete for international traffic to achieve and 
maintain their large network carrier status, due to their limited or non-existent domestic market. Saudia, whilst 
benefitting from the same geographical location of the MEB3, can afford to exploit this advantage less aggressively 
given the compensatory traffic assurances of its huge domestic air market.  
From another perspective, geography also partly explains why the MEB3 have been so successful in establishing 
themselves as global carriers, particularly in connecting traffic via their hour-glass hubs. With the ability to reach one 
third of the world’s population within a 4-hour flight duration, and two thirds of the global population in an 8-hour 
flight radius (Dubai International Airport, 2010), the MEB3 have turned geography into one of their critical success 
factors. In this respect, Emirates - the trailblazer of the Gulf trio - exploited what Singapore Airlines had done 15 years 
before it, and took the Singaporean business model a step further due to a better geographical location leading to better 
worldwide coverage. Turkish Airlines, two decades later, imitated what Emirates had done before and exploited the 
geographical location of its main hub to provide an even more comprehensive network than any of the MEB3, although 
with some challenges reaching as far East as the MEB3.  
The examples mentioned above are only a few of the many demonstrations corroborating geography as a category 
of analysis deserving on many occasions more importance and focus than economics. Alkaabi (2014) pointed out that 
geography is a very important consideration in better understanding the ongoing development and impact of the major 
Gulf carriers. Nancarrow (2013) highlights how the Gulf carriers have been referred to by many industry analysts as 
being located at “the geographic centre of the world”. According to O’Connell (2011), by exploiting geography, 
Emirates has balanced its domestic market deficit. Thus, geography and the Gulf carriers, including Saudia, are 
interlinked and interdependent. Strategic analysis of Saudia through a geographical perspective is fundamental to 
achieving a reliable and holistic analysis of the airline’s strategic context and future prospects.    
Applicable to Saudia are the “four geographical levels” termed by Holloway (2008). These being:   
4.2.1. Region to Region 
Saudia is well positioned to connect West to East (Europe to Asia), East to West (Asia to Africa & Europe), and 
North to South (Europe to East Africa), particularly through its largest transfer hub of Jeddah. Located 2 hours and 30 
minutes flight time West of Dubai, it can readily attract transfer traffic from the MEB3 home hubs as well as Istanbul; 
the latter being 3 hours and 20 minutes flight time away (Air Miles Calculator, 2021). With two large international 
airports capable of handling international traffic, Saudia is well positioned to competitively challenge the weakest 
MEB3 in the short-medium future; arguably that being Etihad which has faced a number of setbacks of late as partners 
have gone bankrupt (e.g. Jet Airways) and senior leadership (and with it strategic plans and goals) have changed. 
4.2.2. Country to Country 
Complimenting the preceding analysis, Saudia is a direct challenger to Turkish Airlines particularly for connecting 
traffic between countries in Europe, Africa and Asia via its two large transfer hubs. This is because of the latter’s 
closer proximity to Turkish’s home transfer hub of Istanbul Ataturk which lies at the intersection between Europe, 
Africa and Asia. This gives Saudia an advantage over the MEB3 in developing a more attractive O&D network from 
the Kingdom with shorter flight segments, although admittedly Turkish enjoys more O&D traffic to Europe with 
higher frequencies (in large part explaining its considerable narrow body fleet size – see Table 1). Saudia also enjoys 
a slight advantage over Ethiopian for most of Europe to Asia travel due to shorter flying times, but it is at a slight 
disadvantage for Europe to Africa travel. Table 1 provides an interesting snapshot into Saudia and five key 
neighbouring competitors. The impact of Saudia’s domestic air market (and the aforementioned regional services) is 
clear with its narrow body fleet and domestic passenger (PAX) destination numbers second only to Turkish Airlines. 
In contrast, Saudia is ranked last for total non-stop international destinations, while top ranked Qatar Airways 
continues to robustly expand its fleet and global network post-blockade and as the COVID-19 pandemic begins easing 
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in many parts of the world. The potential for Saudia to expand its international route network, and to concurrently 
increase its wide body fleet, are plain to see.     


























Saudia (SV) 106 (1) 35 82 (8) 3 27 44 
Emirates (EK) 0 0 182 (83) 208 1 119 
Qatar (QR) 30 (2) 105 170 (19) 106 1 139 
Etihad (EY) 15 (15) 26 53 (19) 72 1 61 
Turkish (TK) 224 (12) 57 112 (10) 31 48 204 
Ethiopian (ET) 41 (11) 27 65 (0) 8 16 92 
4.2.3. City to City  
Saudia has a strong domestic network and together with its flyadeal subsidiary, provides an unrivalled domestic 
network. It serves its international network from five international airports in the Kingdom. This flight web of 
domestic destinations feed Saudia’s international flights with traffic which does not need to be sought from outside 
the Kingdom. In contrast, almost any feeder traffic to the MEB3 transfer hubs has to come from international flights.   
4.2.4. Airport to Airport 
Jeddah and Riyadh are well connected by Saudia, while flyadeal connects a number of secondary airports to them 
as well. 
4.3. Economics 
Applying PEG to analyse an airline includes an economic assessment of the entity, and this can be effectively 
achieved through gauging a range of key economic indicators, and also via a key competitor analysis. This reflects 
the philosophy behind PEG which is to give central importance to politics and geography in terms of the airline 
business, while ensuring economic factors do not take centre-stage but only surround and support the other two core 
analysis categories. This way, economics remains important but not paramount. After all, overall profitability has 
rarely managed to be positive throughout the industry’s century long history.   
Like with the MEB3, information and data availability for Saudia are limited.  Saudia fares particularly poorly 
when it comes to publishing financial information and results. This can be attributed in large measure to its home State 
culture where confidentiality and continuity are highly prized, as opposed to the importance placed on public 
transparency and accountability in more democratic countries (Aquilina Spagnol et al, 2020).  
As the PEG framework analysis has shown in the previous categories, Saudia is an integral part of its home 
Kingdom; not only because it is fully State-owned and a top-10 local brand, but also because with recent moves toward 
greater economic openness and liberalisation, it is seen as essential more than ever to project the Kingdom’s image 
across the globe and to fulfil the economic goals of Vision 2030. Saudi Arabia is also home to Mecca; the holiest 
Muslim city, and therefore hosts the annual Hajj pilgrimage which every physically able Muslim around the world is 
to perform at least once in their lifetime. Crucial to this is Saudia which commands a 40% share of this religious traffic 
(CAPA, 2018b). On charter flights alone, Saudia carried three million passengers for Hajj and Umrah in 2017, totalling 
around seven million when scheduled traffic is included (CAPA, 2018c). In fact, this market segment and Saudia are 
so intertwined that it is one of the stated four pillars of the airline’s transformation programme launched in 2016 
(CAPA, 2018b). 
It is not entirely clear as to what extent Saudia’s financial accounts are segregated from those of the State. The 
airline does not publish any audited financial accounts, and the only gauge of its economic metrics can be done through 
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its limited and selective announcements to the media, and through data which market intelligence providers manage 
to obtain and make available to the research community. Some airline data and related information can also be 
extracted from the annual reports published exclusively in the Arabic language by GACA; the Saudi civil aviation 
authority. 
As far as the economic analysis of Saudia is concerned, supplementing PEG, an analysis through Porter’s five 
forces is carried out. Porter’s five forces model considers industry rivalry (i.e. existing competitors) through the lenses 
of threat of new entrants, threat of substitutes, power of supplies and power of buyers (Shaw, 2016). The outcome of 
this analysis is that Saudia enjoys a low level of threat from all competitive forces acting against it; it comfortably 
enjoys a blue ocean market space; and thus, assuming control on all costs, profitability and viability are ensured, or 
are at least of no material concern to the ongoing long-term viability of the airline.    
4.3.1. Threat of New Entrants  
Although the Saudi air transport market has been open to competition since 2006, the civil aviation authorities have 
been very cautious in allowing new entrants in the market. Apart from Saudia’s own subsidiary flyadeal, only three 
other airlines have been allowed to operate; flynas, Saudi Gulf and Nesma Airlines. Only flynas has a sizeable 
domestic market share accounting for about one third of Saudia’s. Meanwhile, flyadeal was set up in 2016 by Saudia 
itself as a low-cost subsidiary. Since then, Saudia has increased its dominance in the domestic market. Furthermore, 
whilst all carriers are allowed to operate international traffic, most of the bilateral ASAs signed by Saudi Arabia 
designate Saudia as the exclusive operator. If plans for a second national airline materialise, one would assume that 
its development will be synchronised with that of Saudia. Overall, this threat is low. 
4.3.2. Threat of Substitutes 
Domestically, the Kingdom has a limited rail network, and the road network although developed to international 
standards experiences a high accident rate. As for air travel, flynas is the other airline which offers considerable 
competition but to date it trails far behind. International travel by rail within the GCC is not yet possible. By road it is 
limited, and when available it is lengthy and carries a high safety risk. In terms of international air travel, Emirates is 
the only other airline that matches Saudia in terms of capacity from the Kingdom. Overall, this threat is low. 
4.3.3. Power of Suppliers 
With the Saudia Group fully owned by an oil rich Kingdom with a lot of economic and political clout worldwide, 
the power of suppliers is limited. Aircraft orders tend to be negotiated favourably by Saudia as wider trade and 
investment realities in the Kingdom encourage aircraft manufacturers to often offer competitive prices. Saudia is also 
vertically integrated as a group, allowing it to benefit from economies of scale across its value chain. The threat here 
is also low. 
4.3.4. Power of Buyers 
Domestically, airline passengers do have not a great deal of choice in the Kingdom. Saudia has a very comfortable 
market share, while also providing a good low cost offering to rival flynas. Internationally, the main global network 
carrier rival for Saudia is Emirates. Buyers’ power is limited and hence the threat to Saudia is low here as well.  
5. Conclusion 
Saudia remains a fascinating and insightful airline case study yet to be extensively investigated in the scholarly or 
wider industry and media literature. Given the future prospects for Saudia are only likely to improve as its host nation 
continues an ambitious economic diversification and development agenda, it remains an airline worthy of closer 
analysis. The simple and straightforward PEG strategic framework is ideal when analysing airlines like Saudia where 
politics and geography carry more weight in their strategy formulation, compared with other carriers such as private 
low-cost carriers (LCCs) in a red ocean market space. Whilst politics and geography are omnipresent in the airline 
industry, they are accentuated in the case of all the major Gulf carriers where most have been set up to be a national 
industry champion and flag bearer of an oil rich State; that is, a strategic tool for national development. Politics and 
geography, especially their merged counterpart geopolitics, are accentuated because more than economics geopolitics 
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has a huge influence in the strategic management of these airlines. Saudia proves to be a salient case study for use 
with PEG because the framework focuses the analysis mainly on these two crucial categories; both of which are 
fundamental for Saudia. Furthermore, with Saudia difficult to be thoroughly analysed in terms of economic indicators 
alone (or when predominate), PEG becomes a suitable and valuable tool to generate a more meaningful strategic 
picture.  
5.1. Limitation of the paper and further research 
Given that primary data about Saudia are yet to be collected for this doctoral research study, the paper here made 
use of only secondary data when deploying the PEG framework. Furthermore, whilst it has been found that PEG is a 
very suitable strategic framework for airlines where the strategies of which are heavily influenced by geopolitics, it 
would be wise to corroborate the analysis’ outcome, as laid out in this paper, through the use of at least one other 
strategic framework in future. For instance, the politics, economics, social and technological (PEST) framework is a 
widely employed strategic framework in air transport research and would be a prime candidate in this regard.  
As has been noted, the PEG’s “simplicity is not only an asset but also a potential flaw” (Ellis, 2020, p. 222). There 
are other considerations for which the PEG acronym may be too restrictive, such as environmental concerns 
surrounding the industry’s carbon emissions and contribution to climate change (Ellis, 2020). Deploying more than 
one framework will validate better the outcomes herein about Saudia, and give them a firmer grounding.  
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